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SUMMARY
The supplier links of foreign-investment
enterprises (FIEs) started to develop as soon
as they commenced operations in Hungary.
Thus, their interest in developing local roots
was already clear. Empirical evidence has
shown that some FIEs outsourced only a few
services, while others tried to outsource as
much of the production as they could.
The demand of FIEs for local supplies
depends very much on their status in the
global network. Local affiliates of huge
transnational corporations (TNCs) may play
a rather marginal role, or their role and the
scope and nature of their activity may
change over time. In some periods, local
TNC affiliates may also perform very simple
activities of a subcontracting type. In fact,
many do either assembly or simple labour-
intensive processing, which do not provide
much room for local suppliers. Further in-
vestment can develop these activities to-
wards greater added value and sophistica-
tion, but this may be influenced primarily
by foreign direct investment (FDI) and in-
vestment policy, rather than by linkage
promotion.
Another interesting lesson from the
early experiences was that FIEs tended to
establish domestic business links with me-
dium-sized Hungarian companies, apart
from other FIEs. Some of these Hungarian
firms supplied several FIEs in Hungary and
also abroad. They maintained independent
production and had even own products and
brands, but the bulk of their turnover con-
sisted of sub-deliveries and components
shipped to TNCs. These medium-size Hun-
garian companies had similar sourcing
policies to those of the FIEs, with much the
same requirements of would-be suppliers.
The early empirical evidence showed that
second and third-tier suppliers in Hungary,
i.e. small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), could hardly meet these require-
ments. There was much room for develop-
ment.
The Hungarian government has de-
cided to launch a programme aimed at
promoting the establishment of local sup-
plier ties, as the most promising way of en-
couraging positive spillover effects from
FDI. The Supplier Target Programme was
launched in 1998. It aimed to create direct
links between FIEs and Hungarian firms in
selected industries: automobiles, electronics,
and rubber and plastics. In doing so, it fo-
cused on providing information and on
matchmaking, as well as training and con-
sultancy for would-be suppliers among
SMEs. Hungarian firms, especially SMEs,
were placed in the centre of the pro-
gramme, to support their preparations to
meet quality requirements and to help in
matchmaking and contracting. However,
the programme failed to take account of
two facts mentioned earlier: the variety of
interests found in FIEs, and the previous ex-
istence of Hungarian mediators (first-tier
suppliers) on the market. Efforts proved to
be inefficient and the programme was de-
scribed as a failure in a very critical report
on its activity.
The Supplier Target Programme was
reconsidered in 2000 and a new Supplier
Integrator Target Programme launched in
the same year.
The basic idea behind the new pro-
gramme is that existing supplier networks
can be developed further as a nucleus for a
greater and more colourful cooperation
network, a local cluster. It has therefore re-
versed the direction of the promotion activ-
ity, by starting from the needs and require-
ments of FIEs and other integrator firms.
The primary purpose of the programme is
to increase the share of local supplies from
the current 10–20 per cent to 30–40 per
cent. Matchmaking events are continuously
organized. There are plans to update the
established database and expand it to 4000–
5000 records. Training and advising of
SMEs remains on the agenda. Qualification
and auditing of supplier members of the
programme is foreseen (with financial sup-
port from the programme sources). Also
planned is long-term finance for necessary
investments by supplier firms, including
both loans and equity participation (a ven-
ture-capital function). Support for quality-
enhancement programmes also remains in
place. The new state support agency regu-
larly monitors the system and keeps in con-
tact with participants.
The new programme may prove to be
more effective and meet its revised tasks
better than the previous programme did.
There are important new elements. One is
better coordination of the operation and use
of parallel institutions and funds. Another
important element is incorporation in the
programme of both the interested sides.
Linkage promotion should obviously not be
a simple SME-support scheme. The expan-
sion of the horizon of the project to poten-
tial creation of business clusters also looks
promising.
However, there are some problems
with the new projects, of which the most
serious, perhaps, concerns the role of the
state as a venture capitalist. Originally, pro-
gramme-participant state-owned ‘venture-
capital’ enterprises were established for the
purpose of crisis management, not risk
management, and may have troubles with
their new role. Much depends on defining
and describing tasks accurately. One of the
major reasons for the inefficiency of the
previous project was inadequate staff
knowledge of what was expected. In fact,
the new concept was not defined in detail,
so that it is still unclear whether this mis-
take has been avoided this time. It may not
be fair to ask a new institution to cope with
all kinds of development preferences. Per-
haps regional development issues should
not be incorporated into this framework.
However, the new institution is almost cer-
tain to increase further the spatial tensions
in the country, by supporting the develop-
ment of clusters in their present locations,
which are relatively the most developed
parts of Hungary.
The analysis of the Hungarian linkage
promotion package showed that the early
years of operation did not bring a break-
through and the new system is still under
development. It was therefore difficult to
find matching case-study evidence, i.e. case
studies that contain some information about
the usage of this particular development
programme. However, there is plenty of
evidence about linkages where the research
is case-study based. Empirical surveys agree
that Hungarian suppliers play an apprecia-
ble, if fairly small role in FIE activity. The
scale of the contribution lags far behind
what is found in developed countries, espe-
cially if foreign-owned suppliers are ig-
nored. On the other hand, it is markedly
higher than in the developing countries.
The studies also agree that there is an in-
creasing tendency, although the barriers on
the side of Hungarian would-be suppliers
are considerable, especially for SMEs.

5INTRODUCTION
The main aim of this paper is to summarize
the available knowledge on FDI-related
corporate linkages and spillover effects in
Hungary. It also analyses the policy tools
applied by Hungarian governments to pro-
mote the development of linkages and posi-
tive spillover effects. Much of the available
literature on the topic in Hungarian has
been collected here, including as completely
as possible the analyses of linkage-
promoting policies, especially the Supplier
Target Programme (STP) and Integrator
Supplier Target Programme (ISTP). In other
areas, such as the development of corporate
networks and horizontal spillover effects,
the paper is not exhaustive, confining itself
to a few relevant contributions.
There is a relatively rich literature on
spillovers and vertical linkages in Hungary,
which includes some statistics and the re-
sults of several empirical surveys and case
studies. However, little attention is paid to
the policy measures for promoting linkage
creation and development. This paper pays
most attention to describing and analysing
vertical linkages and the support mecha-
nism. Also needed for a better understand-
ing of the special circumstances is a brief
introduction to such related issues as cor-
porate network development up to 1998
and vertical and horizontal spillover effects
from FDI.
Turning to the structure of the paper,
Chapter 1 briefly covers some events in
Hungary’s economic transition that funda-
mentally altered corporate cooperation
networks. The main factors influencing
companies in their decisions about what,
where and from whom to purchase pro-
duction inputs and sell outputs were the
changes in market structure, the radical
downsizing of their activities, the wave of
bankruptcies, the liberalization of trade,
and privatization. These early events fun-
damentally altered the economic environ-
ment for firms, bringing important changes
for all market players – partners, competi-
tors and customers alike.
The increasing importance of trans-
national corporations (TNCs) in the Hun-
garian economy meant that TNCs played a
major part in the change and replacement
of traditional supplier networks. The new,
TNC-related linkages differ strongly from
the old. Chapter 2 therefore describes some
specific features of supplier contacts be-
tween TNCs and Hungarian firms. Chapter
3 summarizes the empirical evidence on the
vertical spillover impacts of TNC–Hungar-
ian SME trade and cooperation linkages.
Chapter 4, dealing with policy issues,
constitutes the main body of the paper.
Topics discussed include the linkage-
development effects of free trade zones, the
roles of various FDI-promotion tools, and
vertical discrimination practice in Hungary.
Also introduced are the findings of some
empirical surveys and case studies, and the
policy conclusions to be drawn from them.
Finally, there is detailed analysis of the STP
and ISTP.
The case-study evidence is presented
in Chapter 5.
1) DECLINE, CHANGE AND RE-
PLACEMENT IN CORPORATE
NETWORKS
This chapter summarizes the events of the
Hungarian transition that led to massive
foreign penetration of the Hungarian econ-
omy, by analysing foreign activity in devel-
oping a direct presence through invest-
ments, trade links and cooperation net-
works.
The reasons for the dissolution and
reorganization of corporate cooperation and
business links in transition economies are
well documented. The first major stimulus
came from the decline and dissolution of
COMECON. The overall liberalization meas-
6ures taken in transition economies quickly
revealed that products produced under
COMECON cooperation agreements were un-
able to compete effectively with Western
imports. Hungary’s was especially depend-
ent on COMECON cooperation and COMECON
markets. It was a small, open economy, over
40 per cent of whose GDP was exported,
with a similarly high proportion of im-
ported production inputs. The dissolution of
COMECON paralysed a large number of en-
terprises and some whole industries, caus-
ing a substantial decline in economic activ-
ity.
At corporate level, the macroeconomic
decline manifested itself in a massive surge
of market exits that took various forms.
Many firms underwent formal insolvency
proceedings and liquidation. The results of
the harsh Hungarian bankruptcy regime of
1992–3 have been well documented by sev-
eral authors (FUTÓ, 1993; SCHAFFER, 1997;
GRAY et al., 1996; MITCHELL 1997). Another,
less draconian form of market exit, still
more important in reducing economic ac-
tivity, was downsizing and voluntary mar-
ket exit. This course was chosen by far more
firms than bankruptcy (BALCEROWICZ et al.,
1998). Furthermore, contraction of activity
had preceded most bankruptcy proceedings
(GRAY et al., 1996). This also indicates that
the decline in economic activity was a sys-
tem-specific feature of transition, rather
than the result of economic-policy mistakes
or faulty institution building. This view is
also supported by the fact that downsizing
on a similar scale occurred also in transition
economies where there were practically no
formal, judicial exits (BALCEROWICZ et al.,
1998). The downsizing on a massive scale,
in both domestic and foreign markets, nec-
essarily led to a contraction of cooperation
networks. Market links that vanished had to
be replaced, in many cases through new
contacts with TNCs. This process was espe-
cially strong in the small, open Hungarian
economy.
The liberalization of trade and eco-
nomic activity increased domestic and for-
eign competition on the Hungarian market,
which had hitherto been strongly protected.
Hungarian firms soon started to replace
suppliers of inferior quality and reliability,
to improve or regain their own competi-
tiveness. This process also started well be-
fore the 1992 wave of bankruptcies and in-
dependently of it. The replacement of sup-
pliers usually meant resorting to imports
from developed economies. There is some
empirical evidence that improved service
from suppliers substantially increased the
competitiveness of numerous Hungarian
firms (SZANYI, 1996). There were funda-
mental changes downstream as well, as the
sales markets of Hungarian firms altered.
The main direction of the changes was re-
placement of COMECON deliveries by sales to
the OECD, especially the EU. The strong
economic growth that ensued in the late
1990s was driven mainly by the greenfield
investments made by TNCs, which then in-
creased the structural openness of the Hun-
garian economy. They also increased the
role of foreign supplies to Hungarian pro-
duction facilities.
Privatization was also an important
factor in the development of corporate net-
works. Hungarian privatization policy fa-
voured sales to foreign strategic investors.
Many firms already had experience of co-
operating with partners in developed coun-
tries, and for obvious reasons, privatization
tended to develop alongside these existing
business links. Also active in this privatiza-
tion process was the management of firms
to be privatized, who often supported the
sale of firms to such existing cooperation
partners. In these cases, cooperation links
strengthened further even before the priva-
tization deal was concluded. When the
transaction was over and the Hungarian
firm had become an affiliate, the business
links up and downstream were reconsid-
ered and substantially changed in most
cases.
72) TNC NETWORKS IN HUNGARY
The reorganization of cooperation links and
the re-creation of value chains proceeded
rather differently in domestically owned
firms and foreign-owned firms. The major
similarity in the recreated value chains was
that in many cases, there would be a core
company acting as integrator of the coop-
eration network. According to some authors
(STARK, 1996; MCDERMOTT, 1996), the inte-
grator firm was typically a Hungarian state-
owned enterprise (SOE) and the owner of its
subcontractors. Thus, the newly created
company network in fact camouflaged the
subsequent survival of only quasi-privatized
economic power centres. Further research
revealed that in fact only a few companies
possessed an ownership-integrated net-
work. Many other former or even currently
state-owned firms established or re-
established cooperation networks with in-
dependent participants (SZANYI, 2001). A
clear tendency to reconstruction of previ-
ously abandoned cooperation was also ob-
served (SZANYI and TARI, 2000). Hungarian
firms also participated and developed stra-
tegic alliances, which became another form
of economic cooperation that spread
quickly. The economic rationale of even
SOE integrated networks was the same as
that of TNC integrated corporate networks
(SZANYI and TARI, 2000). Their existence
fitted well into the general tendency of con-
centrating on core business, outsourcing
and networking.
The networks that evolved round
some Hungarian management buy-outs
(MBOs), acting as integrators, often sought
to re-establish previous cooperation links
with other Hungarian companies. Good ex-
amples are Rába in the road-vehicle indus-
try and Transelektro and Ganz Gépgyár
Holding in electrical machinery (SZANYI and
TARI, 2000). These recreated networks also
sought to improve their competitiveness by
supplementing their cooperation arrange-
ments with new (sometimes foreign) links.
Cooperation in these cases went beyond the
arms-length business links usually found.
Core companies would support their sup-
pliers with technology and know-how, and
sometimes with finance as well. Long-term
contacts were established and cooperation
contracts signed.
When large state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) were purchased by foreign strategic
owner, the development could take various
trajectories, of which three were typical.
One was for the foreign company to
discontinue or severely cut back its produc-
tion in Hungary. A recent example of such
action has been Gy ri Keksz, a biscuit-
making division of Danone. An earlier ex-
ample was the Szolnok Paper Mill, belong-
ing to the Prinzhorn Group. In both cases,
the business changed over time and the
production of Hungarian affiliates became
surplus to requirements. Similar cases have
also occurred with greenfield FDI capacity,
for instance with Nokia’s monitor factory
and the recent move by Mannesmann from
Europe to Asia. It therefore becomes possible
not to accuse of deliberate liquidation of
Hungarian competitors strategic investors
who abandon the privatized facilities they
have acquired. However, the closure of
companies certainly affects suppliers as
well.
Other strategic investors simply took
over the previous activity of the privatized
firm and developed it, more or less as an
independent Hungarian subsidiary. This
happened on a mass scale in certain
branches of the food industry, where inter-
national division of labour was not wide-
spread (JANSIK, 2001; SZABÓ, 2000). In these
cases, the development of cooperation net-
works was rather similar to the pattern of
other, Hungarian-owned firms in the same
market.
However, the most important pattern
of TNC penetration in Hungarian manu-
facturing industry was integration of ac-
quired or established affiliates into the in-
ternational (global) corporate network of
the new owner. In the case of acquired fa-
8cilities, this involved substantial tailoring of
activities. The degree of specialization usu-
ally became much greater than before and
the number of products and activities car-
ried out much reduced. Auxiliary activities
such as like R and D, own logistics, training,
etc. were often discontinued (FARKAS, 1997
and 1999).
In some instances, the reshaping of
activities was so extensive that very little
remained of the original company, which
was restructured according to the different
role it was to play in the global network of
the new owner. In fact, many companies
differed very little from TNC greenfield in-
vestments after such restructuring. They
were only using the same buildings, office
space and of course labour as the business
they had taken over. The cooperating net-
works of such companies were also re-
shaped, of course. Previous suppliers were
seldom able to retain their positions, as
TNCs preferred to rely on established sup-
pliers to the group, even if that meant im-
porting inputs.
In other cases, restructuring was less
fundamental. Much of the activity was
maintained, providing an opportunity for
continued business links with previous sup-
pliers, so long as they met the increased ex-
pectations. The continued presence of an
incumbent management in privatized firms
also increased the propensity to maintain
previous supplier links. Where local sup-
plies were replaced with imports, this was
often done as a safety measure by the new
owner, to secure smooth operation with
traditional partners. Lack of knowledge of
local supplier capacities could also prevent
new owners from resorting to advantageous
local sources. Local supplies began to grow
strongly in such cases as the local knowl-
edge of the new management increased.
This learning period could be saved if the
incumbent management was retained.
A significant proportion of the FDI in
Hungary is linked to local suppliers,
through subcontracting contracts and links
of outward processing trade (OPT). In fact,
the latter accounts for a quarter of Hun-
gary’s exports (ANTALÓCZY and SASS, 1998),
so that many facilities operating in Hungary
are subject of OPT. As well as Hungarian
firms entering into subcontracting deals
with TNCs, there are many TNC affiliates
that also perform OPT. These are greenfield
investments, which work under the provi-
sions of international OPT regulations, as a
way of gaining some of the benefits of such
deals.
From the present point of view, sub-
contracting and OPT are interesting as a
deliberate activity of many Hungarian
firms. There were fierce discussions on the
drawbacks of such trade (described in
PELLEGRIN, 1998). The most common re-
proaches were that subcontracting firms
became isolated from the rest of the econ-
omy, saw little technology transfer or pro-
gress, experienced little income generation,
lacked resources for investment, abandoned
their own R and D, and became locked in
positions with no alternative products of
their own. More recent analyses and em-
pirical surveys (ANTALÓCZY and SASS, 1998;
SZANYI 2001) revealed that the nature of
subcontracting was changing over time into
a form of international networking. Many
Hungarian firms entering subcontracting
links with TNCs chose such a link deliber-
ately as the cornerstone of their restructur-
ing efforts. They hoped thereby to receive
strategic inputs for restructuring: technol-
ogy, know-how and markets. It also turned
out that subcontracting was not so badly
paid after all. Many firms entered it gained
acceptable levels of profits. The authors
stated that subcontracting was an important
channel by which Hungarian small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) could in-
tegrate into international corporate net-
works.
To sum up this chapter, it can be con-
cluded that there was a variety of coopera-
tion network development in Hungary after
the initial years in which such networks
dissolved. At one extreme, there were
greenfield investments based on close coop-
eration with traditional suppliers. Their ac-
tivity in Hungary was reduced to a handful
of lines, with very little capacity for receiv-
9ing local inputs. On the other hand, many
privatized firms, both domestic and foreign-
owned, started vigorous development of co-
operation networks, but often concentrated
on local suppliers. Some even wished to re-
store some cooperation links previously
disrupted. An important, special feature was
the extensive spread of subcontracting links.
Subcontracting evolved over time into a
new form of international corporate net-
work. Many Hungarian firms entered into
international cooperation through this
channel, using it as a primary tool for re-
construction and modernization.
3) EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON
VERTICAL LINKAGES AND SPILLOVER
EFFECTS OF TNCS
The empirical research on the vertical link-
ages of TNCs can be classified into two
groups. Some papers set out to estimate the
volume of local activity performed by TNCs
and their local suppliers. Others concen-
trate more on qualitative changes and the
spillover effects of cooperation with TNCs
(UNCTAD, 2001, p. 192). Debate on the po-
tential and real impacts of TNC penetration
into transition economies started immedi-
ately after the volume of FDI flows began to
increase in the early 1990s. Much evidence
has been collected since on the positive and
negative features of FDI and its spillover ef-
fects.
Unfortunately, there has hardly been
a neutral contribution to the debate, since
researchers, policy-makers and institutions
alike approach it from predetermined an-
gles. Some observers see FDI and TNC activ-
ity in transition economies from the
strongly critical and sceptical platform
shared by many development economists,
starting from the collective experience of
TNC activity in the Third World in the
1950s–1970s. At the other extreme are ob-
servers who believe that FDI is the main (or
even single) motive force for economic
turnaround and modernization in the tran-
sition economies. They tend to neglect or
belittle even obvious cases of negative ex-
ternalities.
The following account concentrates
on four distinct issues, which can be re-
garded as positive or negative externalities
of FDI or of participation in TNC networks.
The first is the changing production and
trade patterns of economies and firms. Also
linked with this are subcontracting and
outward processing trade (OPT). The third
topic is foreign-investment enterprise (FIE)
activity in industrial free-trade zones. The
fourth is technology transfer and R and D.
Chapter 4 then follows on with the problem
of business links between FIEs and domestic
firms.
3.1. Integration through trade links
An important line of empirical literature
concerns the impact of FDI on trade flows.
The topic was picked up by several scholars
(e.g. DJANKOV and HOEKMAN, 1996; NAUJOKS
and SCHMIDT, 1995; ÉLTETŐ, 1999;
SEREGHYOVA, 1998). The main point here is
whether the westward reorientation of ex-
port and import flows helped to upgrade
facilities and integrate international pro-
duction networks efficiently into the econ-
omy (positive externalities), or whether the
reorientation degraded export facilities and
caused loss of value added potentials (nega-
tive externalities). Intra-industry trade is
regarded as a sign of close integration,
while supply of raw materials, energy and
simple processed goods is usually associated
with inferior positions in international
trade.
Recent analyses (ÉLTETŐ, 1999 and
2001; SEREGHYOVA, 1998; HUNYA, 2000) re-
veal that FDI in the transition economies of
Central Europe changed massively the vol-
ume and sectoral structure of foreign trade.
The share of high and medium-technology
products increased dramatically, while the
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share of low-tech products in exports de-
clined. Consequently, the characteristics of
exports became very similar to what is
found in developed industrialized countries.
Critical observers regard this as misleading,
arguing that the sectoral breakdown of the
statistical system is not fine enough to cap-
ture the quality of local value added
(SEREGHYOVA, 1998). Szalavetz (2000) states
that the ‘technology content of the products
is…unrelated to the skill content of the
work input’ (p. 73), so that the spectacular
achievements in upgrading export structure
should be treated with some caution.
Djankov and Hoekman (1996) found
that the export performance of Central and
Eastern European (CEE) economies corre-
lated strongly with growth in vertical intra-
industry trade with the EU. In trying to ex-
plain changes in intra-industry trade, they
found that level of FDI was the only signifi-
cant explanatory factor for the development
of intra-industry trade. Other variables,
such as relative level of GDP or geographi-
cal distance, were not significant. Similar
findings were made by Naujoks and
Schmidt (1995).
A possible interpretation is that the
export performance increased most in the
transition economies integrated into vertical
intra-firm cooperation networks via FDI. In
transition economies, intra-industry trade
mainly means intra-firm trade. This argu-
ment also holds for complete value chains
integrated by TNCs. Intra-industry trade in
this sense means trade among economically
dependent but legally distinct firms. This
may hold for traditional supplier networks
of TNCs, as well as for outward processing
(e.g. subcontracting) by CEE firms for TNCs.
Naujoks and Schmidt (1995) also
draw the attention to an increasing share of
outward processing activities in intra-
industry trade. Outward processing was
also found to be highly relevant for CEE
countries by other authors (e.g. ÉLTETŐ and
SASS, 1998; PELLEGRIN, 1998; SEREGHYOVA,
1998), who argue that a high share of tight
intra-firm trade is most likely to occur with
highly complex manufactures, where trans-
actions include intangible assets or R and D-
intensive goods. Makers of standardized
goods enter not into equity links, but into
intra-industry type of trade, such as out-
ward processing. This means intra-
industry-type trade, not intra-firm trade. In
both cases, Naujoks and Schmidt argue that
cooperation leads to downgrading of opera-
tions, rather than upgrading, or at least,
partners ‘flatten out’ into a simple sub-
delivery base or assembly unit. Sereghyova
(1998) and Farkas (1997) also provide
some empirical evidence of downgrading of
activities in Czech and Hungarian firms
privatized through FDI.
The main concluding remark here is
that FDI fundamentally changed the trade
patterns of transition economies. Hungary’s
production growth was fuelled by exports.
FIE influence was strong in various direc-
tions: assemblers and host-country export-
ers boosted trade volume through their own
activity. This trade was mainly intra-
industry, resulting from global specializa-
tion, and in the case of assemblers, mostly
intra-firm. The product structure of trade
also changed. High and medium-tech prod-
uct groups gained importance, while low-
tech manufacturing exports declined stead-
ily. However, the favourable changes in
commodity structure do not necessarily re-
flect a skilled labour-intensive local contri-
bution. Another strong direction of TNC-
related changes in trade patterns is an in-
creasing share of outward processing trade
(OPT).
3.2. Subcontracting and the role of
OPT
Subcontracting became an important activ-
ity for many Hungarian manufacturers,
thus boosting the proportion of OPT in total
foreign trade turnover. The share of OPT in
exports was as high as 30 per cent in the
early years of the transition and declined
only relatively, to some 20 per cent, by the
late 1990s, without losing real volume. In
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fact, the exports of many new greenfield
investments started to grow much faster
than that, while OPT turnover remained
rather stagnant (SZANYI, 2001b). This issue
is more important here, since it is one of the
most frequent forms of cooperation by
Hungarian firms with TNCs (located
abroad). The mainstream opinion about
subcontracting and OPT regards them very
negatively. Sereghyova (1998) calls it a
‘prolonged workbench with the exclusion of
any innovative initiative of the eastern OPT
partner, which leads to the degeneration of
the technological potential of the firm
linked to the sourcing network of the part-
ner in this manner – especially if the ma-
jority of its capacity is dedicated to OPT’ (p.
39).
On the other hand, subcontracting is a
frequent form of corporate outsourcing and
networking. Subcontracting also accompa-
nied the establishment of the new coopera-
tion structures of the ‘new economy’. In this
new role, the characteristics of this form of
cooperation changed, yielding many of the
advantages usually attributed to the ‘new
economy’ or ‘network economy’. Subcon-
tracting today is flexible, steadily more du-
rable, inclusive of technology and knowl-
edge transfer, and productive of adequate
level of profits. Szanyi (2001b) tested em-
pirically the main features of subcontract-
ing links, using a Hungarian sample of
some 120 subcontractors and 300 other
companies. Apart from the new phenomena
just mentioned, it was found that subcon-
tracting became a strategy for catching up
that many Hungarian manufacturing firms
deliberately selected. Furthermore, it at-
tracted numerous companies that engaged
in subcontracting only ‘part time’ (i.e. in
whose turnover it played a minor role), be-
cause it provided an adequate alternative
source of revenue and profit. Subcontract-
ing was not being chosen as a last resort in
any hopeless attempt at survival.
Antalóczy and Sass (1998) provide
plenty of anecdotal and case-study evidence
of the positive spillover effects of subcon-
tracting. Their main conclusion is that sub-
contracting provides chances of the accu-
mulation necessary for corporate adjust-
ment and modernization technology, know-
how, capital, investments and market ex-
pertise. Many subcontracting firms main-
tain their own production as well. As far as
spillover effects are concerned, they em-
phasize the possibility of advancing from a
subcontracting position to full supplier
status. TNCs may be interested in promoting
this shift. This is apparent in the way that
local sourcing has become more widespread
in subcontracting relationships.
It is possible to agree with Szalavetz
(2000) in finding that concentration on
production instead of pre-production and
post-production activities is less beneficial
for Hungarian manufacturing firms. But
participation as a production plant in the
globalizing value chains of TNCs may pro-
vide more modernization impetus than re-
maining outside such networks. There is
some evidence of positive shifts, for example
in R and D activities (INZELT, 1998;
SZALAVETZ, 1999). Furthermore, the share of
local value added in OPT has increased
substantially, partly as a result of an in-
creasing share of activity conducted in
Hungary, the increasing sophistication of
the activity, and the change in the com-
modity structure of OPT. The role of tradi-
tional light industry declined, while that of
the metal-forming and chemical industries,
and electronics, increased (ANTALÓCZY and
SASS, 1998).
OPT and subcontracting became a
form of corporate networking worldwide,
as the participation of Hungarian firms in
this type of cooperation also reflects. They
deliberately chose subcontracting as an op-
portunity to join global production net-
works and enjoy the benefits of global net-
working. Recent research has identified the
positive spillover effects that subcontracting
had on Hungarian firms.
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3.3. Greenfield investments in indus-
trial free-trade zones (IFTZs)
Of the various types of FIE, special attention
has to be paid to assemblers and their tradi-
tional suppliers. In transition economies as
elsewhere, assemblers have often induced
partners to follow them and establish new
facilities near them. Follow-up investments
have been especially frequent in the car in-
dustry and electronics (SOMAI, 2000;
ANTALÓCZY and SASS, 2000; UNCTAD,
2001). In most cases, these were greenfield
investments. Even affiliates that were based
on a privatization purchase were reshaped
to such an extent that they can be regarded
as greenfield (ANTALÓCZY and SASS, 2000).
Since the primary motive in such cases is to
utilize accessible cheap production inputs
(labour), they are extremely sensitive to
costs. This applies although they operate in
capital-intensive industries, where the local
input of labour represents only a tiny frac-
tion of total costs. These firms operate with
the lowest unit labour costs (ÉLTETŐ, 2001)
and take advantage of various methods in
Hungary of reducing their capital spending
as well.
The IFTZ regime was introduced in
1982, with the aim of attracting export-
oriented, high technology FDI to Hungary
and of integrating firms operating in the
zones into the host economy. It was recog-
nized that there was a risk of creating a
dual economy by this. It was therefore de-
cided to allow any firm to set up a zone,
without specifying any spatial restrictions in
the licence from the customs and finance
authorities. IFTZs are regarded as extra-
territorial for duties, foreign exchange and
other legislation. Otherwise dutiable ma-
chinery and production inputs are not sub-
ject to customs duties or VAT. A single com-
pany may set up several IFTZs. This is an
extremely favourable regulation for assem-
blers whose only local input is labour, as it
allows them to import high-value equip-
ment duty free.
The number of firms operating in
IFTZs and the scope of their activities in-
creased rapidly during the 1990s. Repre-
sentatives of the automotive and electronics
industries settled almost exclusively in
IFTZs. Assemblers such as GM, Suzuki and
Philips were followed into IFTZs by their
competitors and suppliers (Ford, Audi, IBM,
Nokia, LEAR Corporation, United Technolo-
gies, Sony, Zollner, etc.). In fact, Hungary’s
largest FDI investments with the highest
turnover and export shares are almost all
foreign assemblers in IFTZs. The economic
impact of this group of FIEs is very signifi-
cant. They were providing 6 per cent of
manufacturing employment in 1999, while
producing 42.8 per cent for export, with a
positive trade balance of over USD 2 billion.
Obviously, the weight of these companies
was largely determinant in the changing
commodity structure of trade (ANTALÓCZY
and SASS, 2000).
Local supplies to the IFTZ-based as-
sembly firms are very limited: a number of
services (such as planning and construction
of buildings and facilities), packaging and
other materials, electric power and similar
utilities. The limited number of Hungarian
suppliers to the core activity usually follow
the assemblers and move into an IFTZ. On
the other hand, overseas investors oriented
towards EU or CEFTA markets are usually
more interested in developing local supply
networks. Japanese Suzuki even gave up its
IFTZ status to enable a larger number of
Hungarian suppliers to join its supplier de-
velopment programme. But clearly, IFTZ
status is a major obstacle to local supplies
development.
3.4. Questions of technology transfer
and R and D
The spillover effects to receive most atten-
tion have been the transfer of knowledge
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and technology and the development of R
and D activity. The spectrum of opinion
ranges from the emphasis on devastating
effects (SEREGHYOVA, 1998; FARKAS, 1997) to
optimistic views (INZELT 1998). The opin-
ions of some authors have changed over
time, which reflects some observable devel-
opment in the area (FARKAS, 1997, as com-
pared with FARKAS, 1999). Papers on the
topic have usually concentrated on case-
study evidence. Statistics were analysed by
Inzelt (1998), Éltető (1998 and 2001) and
Antalóczy and Sass (2000).
The statistics indicate that there has
been a steep decline in R and D spending in
Hungary, in both state-cum-university out-
lay and industrial sponsorship. The overall
level of expenditure was a mere 0.5 per
cent of GDP in 1998, as opposed to 2.3 per
cent in 1988 (FARKAS, 1999). Strong critics
of FDI argue that the new type of integra-
tion for CEE companies involves a complete
elimination of R and D activity. Laboratories
are shut down and experts fired in Hun-
gary, while R and D is performed at corpo-
rate headquarters, not at local affiliates.
Early empirical evidence already showed
that this account was not entirely accurate.
There was a reduction in R and D, but also a
change in the activity that remained in the
transition economies (SZANYI and TARI,
2000). The previously widespread, but in-
efficient R and D structure was reduced to a
few areas. Basic research was usually re-
placed by more activity associated with
product development. However, Szalavetz
(1999) characterized the process as one in
which the integration of subsidiaries into
global R and D networks occurred at levels
‘below their technological capability
threshold’.
Statistics indicate that FIEs spent 45
per cent of the total industrial R and D in
Hungary in 1997 and that the share was
increasing (ÉLTETŐ, 2001). The R and D in-
tensity of FIEs was much higher than that of
domestic companies (INZELT, 1998; HABUDA
and SZALAVETZ, 1999). Antalóczy and Sass
(2000) reported on several companies that
were moving R and D capacities into Hun-
gary, including Audi, Nokia, Philips,
Siemens, GE, Knorr Bremse, ABB and Er-
icsson. There are even foreign firms in
Hungary that had no production facility
here, simply an R and D centre (for exam-
ple, Tateyama of Japan). Moreover, the
firms most active in R and D included some
assemblers. Inzelt (1998) differentiated
between two periods in FIE behaviour to-
wards local R and D. The first period of ‘ac-
quaintance’ was spent in taking over or es-
tablishing capacities, and with a first con-
frontation with the R and D potentials in
Hungary. The second period, which began
in the mid-1990s, was one of ‘feeling at
home’, in which FIEs started to make use of
the capacities.
Habuda and Szalavetz (1999) also
dealt with the level and efficiency of tech-
nology transfer. They emphasized the strong
absorption capacity of CEE countries, based
on a high inherited level of human capital.
The good performance of local technical
staff was the feature that attracted the inter-
est of FIEs in local R and D potential. FIEs
themselves participate actively in human
resource development. Besides training
staff, many have active contacts with uni-
versities. Creating links between FIEs, do-
mestic firms and universities to improve R
and D capacities is an important plank of
Hungarian industrial policy, with FIEs as the
usual direct beneficiaries from the pro-
grammes.
The technology level of Hungarian
manufacturing undoubtedly increased after
the transition. The most important compo-
nent of investment in the 1998 statistics was
still ‘imported machinery’. FIEs purchased
81 per cent of all the machinery and
equipment imported, so that they were the
main force behind the spread of modern
technology. Éltető (2001) quotes a govern-
ment survey that concludes, ‘The level of
technology is higher and the machinery and
equipment better if (a) the company size is
larger, (b) the firm has a foreign owner, (c)
the firm is in certain sectors like telecom-
munications and innovative segment of en-
gineering industry.’ Domestic firms, notably
suppliers to FIEs, also benefit from technol-
ogy spillovers. All major empirical contri-
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butions have reported such effects. In fact,
this is a necessity if regular cooperation is to
be maintained. Szalavetz (1999) argues that
the depressing picture presented by the R
and D statistics is misleading because it un-
derestimates spillover effects and the vol-
ume of technology transfer.
FIEs are technologically more devel-
oped than domestic firms, which enhances
their competitiveness. There is empirical
evidence of technology spillover effects: a
technological match between an FIE and
local suppliers is a precondition for coop-
eration. FIEs have streamlined the R and D
activity of local affiliates. The tasks and op-
eration of R and D personnel have changed
and their scope has been reduced. After an
initial learning phase, many FIEs started to
increase their R and D efforts in Hungary,
after grasping the opportunities for using
highly trained local staff with active support
from the state.
4) LINKAGE PROMOTION
In 1997, the Hungarian government de-
cided to launch a programme aimed at
promoting the establishment of local sup-
plier ties, as the most promising way of en-
couraging positive spillover effects from
FDI. The Supplier Target Programme was
launched in 1998. After two years of op-
eration, some basic principles were recon-
sidered and the programme relaunched in
2000.
The supplier links of FIEs started to
develop as soon as they commenced opera-
tions in Hungary. Thus, their interest in de-
veloping local roots was already clear. Em-
pirical evidence has shown that some FIEs
outsourced only a few services, while others
tried to outsource as much of the produc-
tion as they could. A comparison of Suzuki
and GM-Opel, for example, made it clear
that substantial local delivery became bene-
ficial to the FIE and its local suppliers once
the level of production had exceeded a
minimal threshold. GM-Opel’s production
of 15,000 cars a year was below that
threshold: it was not economical to start
producing components for the car in Hun-
gary. Apart from some auxiliary services,
only the battery and the motor oil were
sourced in Hungary. At the same time, local
content requirements and the absence of a
traditional background industry led Suzuki
to seek actively for local suppliers from the
outset. This activity was also supported by
the Hungarian government (SOMAI, 2000).
The demand of FIEs for local supplies
depends very much on their status in the
global network. Local affiliates of huge
TNCs may play a rather marginal role, or
their role and the scope and nature of their
activity may change over time (SZANYI,
1999). In some periods, local TNC affiliates
may also perform very simple activities of a
subcontracting type. In fact, many do either
assembly or simple labour-intensive proc-
essing, which do not provide much room
for local suppliers. Further investment can
develop these activities towards greater
added value and sophistication, but this may
be influenced primarily by FDI and invest-
ment policy, rather than by linkage promo-
tion. MVAKHT (2000) provides some esti-
mates of the proportion of local supplies to
some important TNC affiliates in Hungary:
Audi < 10%
Ford > 20%
GM 10–20%
Philips c. 10%
Suzuki c. 10%
GE-Tungsram 60–70%
Electrolux 40–50%
Sony < 5%
Opel cars 7%
Opel gears 40–45%
Rába 40–45%
United Technologies
Automotive
c. 10%
Another interesting lesson from the
early experiences was that FIEs tended to
establish domestic business links with me-
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dium-sized Hungarian companies, apart
from other FIEs. Some of them supplied sev-
eral FIEs in Hungary and also abroad. Com-
panies like Rába, Ganz, Transelektro,
Videoton and Bakony Művek were all tradi-
tional medium-sized companies in the
automotive and electronics industries that
were not sold to foreigners. They main-
tained independent production and had
even own products and brands, but the bulk
of their turnover consisted of sub-deliveries
and components shipped to TNCs. These
medium-size Hungarian companies had
similar sourcing policies to those of the FIEs,
with much the same requirements of
would-be suppliers (SZANYI and TARI, 2000).
The early empirical evidence showed that
second and third-tier suppliers in Hungary,
i.e. SMEs, could hardly meet these require-
ments. There was much room for develop-
ment.
4.1. The Supplier Target Programme
The Supplier Target Programme (STP) rec-
ognized this need for SME development. It
aimed to create direct links between FIEs
and Hungarian firms in selected industries:
automobiles, electronics, and rubber and
plastics. In doing so, it focused on providing
information and on matchmaking, as well
as training and consultancy for would-be
suppliers among SMEs. Hungarian firms,
especially SMEs, were placed in the centre
of the programme, to support their prepa-
rations to meet quality requirements and to
help in matchmaking and contracting.
However, the programme failed to take ac-
count of two facts mentioned earlier: the
variety of interests found in FIEs, and the
previous existence of Hungarian mediators
(first-tier suppliers) on the market.
The main partners in the programme
were local chambers of commerce, ITD
Hungary, the Hungarian Foundation for
Enterprise Development (HFED) with its re-
gional network, and the STP Programme
Office. The HFED and the chambers organ-
ized training programmes for SMEs, to im-
part what TNCs were looking for in general
and what techniques to use in cooperating
with them. They also provided advisory
support and support for the auditing of
SMEs’ books. ITD Hungary managed a large
database with files of on some 250,000 en-
trepreneurs (many of them part-time entre-
preneurs) and provided information for
matchmaking. For the latter, the main fo-
rum was a series of meetings for business
people and suppliers’ fairs, where the two
sides were to meet and the SMEs were ex-
pected to receive concrete, specific infor-
mation about requirements. State mediators
of the programme wished to support the
specific needs of SMEs during the process of
preparing to qualify as suppliers.
These efforts proved to be inefficient
and the programme was described as a fail-
ure in a very critical report on its activity.
Almost all the activities carried out failed to
bring the expected results. Most striking
was the fact that a full-size questionnaire
survey reported only a couple of dozen new
contracts resulting from the programme.
Nor did the potential pool of suppliers de-
velop. There were only some 1500 entre-
preneurs qualifying for the programme
(with accounts audited through the pro-
gramme). Estimates put the number of po-
tential suppliers at 5000–7000 (MVKHT,
2000), so that even the prime-target SME
population resisted entry into the pro-
gramme. (They were approached by ordi-
nary mail, which was a technical mistake.)
The primary tools of the programme
were training and education, advisory
services, support for quality-control pro-
grammes, and preparation for credit appli-
cations. The financial support was separated
from general purposes, and tended, in line
with a management decision, to prefer sin-
gle-supplier arrangements. Financial sup-
port for general programme purposes was
only provided for the auditing of the books
of participating SMEs. The programme
funds were dispensed by its management in
a fashion similar to venture capital, with the
STP management evaluated projects and de-
ciding on financing.
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The local network of the programme
was also inefficient. It was not able to at-
tract the interest of FIEs, which did not send
representatives to local STP offices or to
meetings they organized. The reasons for
this failure were twofold. Sourcing by FIEs is
not carried out locally, so that contacts with
FIE sourcing personnel need higher-level
involvement. In this regard, STP officials
were not adequate as partners for FIE rep-
resentatives. Secondly, contacts with poten-
tial local suppliers were already established
through the signing of local Supplier Charts
(another initiative of the Hungarian gov-
ernment) by both parties. Thus, the most
important contacts were already present.
Local partners of FIEs (mainly medium-
sized firms) did not enter the programme
because they were not approached and in-
vited. It was SME-related instead.
MVKHT (2000) puts the matter
plainly: ‘FIEs were in contact with suppliers
without the STP, they knew about the sup-
pliers’ production and financial problems
without the STP, and they sought new sup-
pliers without the STP. On top of all that,
their opinions were not canvassed during
the preparation of the STP, either about the
conditions of the supplier background or
about their suggestions on what to do. Ac-
tive FIE participation in the programme
could not be expected when the STP did not
contribute to the programme with matching
own financing’ (pp. 30–31).
4.2. The Supplier Integrator Target
Programme
The Supplier Target Programme was recon-
sidered in 2000 and a new Supplier Inte-
grator Target Programme (SITP) launched
in the same year. The establishment of this
new framework had not been completed
when this paper was being prepared (in
November 2001), so that only the new con-
cept can be presented.
The new programme focuses on ex-
isting supplier networks. At the centre of
these is the core company, the ‘integrator’,
which is the primary partner of the state
agent. The integrators already chosen are
Suzuki, GE, Audi, Opel and Rába. The inte-
grators actively contribute to planning and
creating a cooperation network or business
cluster, in which suppliers, the R and D
centres of innovative companies and local
development agencies work together. The
development of such clusters is also sup-
ported by another government funding
programme known as the Széchenyi Plan.
The state partner of the integrator is
the local office of the Regional Development
Corporation (RDC), a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of the State Property Management
and Privatization Co. The RDC manages
long-term state property and provides crisis
management for some still-ailing SOEs. The
RDC defines itself as a venture-capital firm,
in the new sense of this term. However, it
does not deal with the classic venture-
capital activity of financing and promoting
innovative and therefore high-risk start-
ups. Its activity is now extended to manag-
ing the SITP funds and the cluster-
development funds under the Széchenyi
Plan. Apart from the RDC, other new sup-
plier agencies will be established, based
partly on the network of the Hungarian
Enterprise Development Foundation. Other,
local institutions (chambers, offices of ITD
Hungary, etc.) may also apply for designa-
tion singly or jointly. These agencies will be
responsible for the operative tasks. A new
institution, the Supplier Employment Com-
pany, has also been set up, to train and edu-
cate labour to be employed in partner com-
panies.
The basic idea behind the new pro-
gramme is that existing supplier networks
can be developed further as a nucleus for a
greater and more colourful cooperation
network, a local cluster. It has therefore re-
versed the direction of the promotion activ-
ity, by starting from the needs and require-
ments of FIEs and other integrator firms.
The primary purpose of the programme is
to increase the share of local supplies from
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the current 10–20 per cent to 30–40 per
cent. Matchmaking events are continuously
organized. There are plans to update the
established database and expand it to 4000–
5000 records. Training and advising of
SMEs remains on the agenda. Qualification
and auditing of supplier members of the
programme is foreseen (with financial sup-
port from the programme sources). Also
planned is long-term finance for necessary
investments by supplier firms, including
both loans and equity participation (a ven-
ture-capital function). Support for quality-
enhancement programmes also remains in
place. The new state support agency regu-
larly monitors the system and keeps in con-
tact with participants.
The new programme may prove to be
more effective and meet its revised tasks
better than the previous programme did.
There are important new elements. One is
better coordination of the operation and use
of parallel institutions and funds. Another
important element is incorporation in the
programme of both the interested sides.
Linkage promotion should obviously not be
a simple SME-support scheme. The expan-
sion of the horizon of the project to poten-
tial creation of business clusters also looks
promising.
However, there are some problems
with the new projects, of which the most
serious, perhaps, concerns the role of the
state as a venture capitalist. The RDC and
other state-owned ‘venture-capital’ enter-
prises were established for the purpose of
crisis management, not risk management,
and may have troubles with their new role.
Unfortunately, there are very few private
venture-capital firms in the region, so that
state-owned companies have to serve as a
second best solution in crisis management
as well. It is also questionable whether the
new type of local ‘supplier agency’ will be
much different or more active and efficient
than the previous local network was. Much
depends on defining and describing tasks
accurately. One of the major reasons for the
inefficiency of the previous project was in-
adequate staff knowledge of what was ex-
pected. In fact, the new concept was not
defined in detail, so that it is still unclear
whether this mistake has been avoided this
time. It may not be fair to ask a new institu-
tion to cope with all kinds of development
preferences. Perhaps regional development
issues should not be incorporated into this
framework. However, the new institution is
almost certain to increase further the spatial
tensions in the country, by supporting the
development of clusters in their present lo-
cations, which are relatively the most devel-
oped parts of Hungary.
5) THE LATEST EMPIRICAL AND CASE-
STUDY EVIDENCE ON LINKAGES
The analysis of the Hungarian linkage pro-
motion package in the last sub-section
showed that the early years of operation did
not bring a breakthrough and the new sys-
tem is still under development. It was
therefore difficult to find matching case-
study evidence, i.e. case studies that contain
some information about usage of this par-
ticular development programme. There is
plenty of evidence about linkages, for ex-
ample in Szanyi and Tari (2000) and
Habuda and Szalavetz (2001), where the
research is case-study based. This section
includes an account of the findings of a new
paper on linkages, ÚT-EUROCON Bt. (2001),
which contains some interesting case stud-
ies. In addition, two interesting empirical
surveys were conducted on the subject in
2001. Réthi (2001) interviewed 25 suppli-
ers, while GM (2001) approached 40 TNCs
about supplier linkages.
The two empirical surveys (RÉTHI,
2001; GM, 2001) focus on opposite ends of
the linkages, but they agree that Hungarian
suppliers play an appreciable, if fairly small
role in FIE activity. The scale of the contri-
bution lags far behind what is found in de-
veloped countries, especially if foreign-
owned suppliers are ignored. On the other
hand, it is markedly higher than in the de-
veloping countries. The two studies also
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agree that there is an increasing tendency,
although the barriers on the side of Hun-
garian would-be suppliers are considerable,
especially for SMEs.
GM (2001) identified a number of
problems with the 40 largest TNC affiliates.
Only two of them had the power to decide
independently on local purchases. Large-
scale sourcing is organized at group head-
quarters, or at least, contracts have to be
approved there, so that the possibly accessi-
ble share of procurement is currently below
20 per cent of turnover, and even lower (5–
6 per cent on average) if services not tightly
bound to the core business are excluded
(cleaning, catering, etc.) There are some
well known barriers to delivery on the side
of the suppliers as well: quality, adequate
technology, capacity constraints, reliable
delivery, lack of capital for financing cur-
rent expenses, and failure to share common
management values with FIEs. This last
barrier relates, for example, to the continu-
ous search for improvements and cost cuts.
All these problems are identified also
by Réthi (2001), who identifies the exis-
tence and strengthening of two supplier
tiers, and concluded that they were in dif-
ferent position as regards potential supplies
to FIEs. SMEs have practically no chance in
their current status to directly join FIEs net-
works. Due to their small size, inadequate
technology and know-how, and limited
management capabilities, their operation
tends to be concentrated on short-term de-
cisions. They are simply not strong enough
to afford longer-term cooperation links.
Nonetheless, they are present and able to
capture a share in deliveries, even through
short-term strategies.
As far as medium-sized Hungarian
companies are concerned (the integrators),
the same problems hold, but their capabili-
ties are significantly better and they can
successfully overcome their shortcomings.
Their position has stabilized during the
transition process. They also have ambitious
development plans to eliminate the prob-
lems, using funds from a range of sources,
above all own resources and state assistance
(RÉTHI 2001, p. 78). Both studies mention
positive examples of FIEs giving suppliers
direct support (technology, finance and
know-how), but the number of such com-
panies is rather limited. More typical is a
tendency to isolation. Réthi found that for-
eign-owned suppliers unilaterally depended
on assembler FIEs and had almost no sup-
plier contacts with other companies in
Hungary.
ÚT-EUROCON (2001) describes the
supplier programmes of three FIE integra-
tors. Mátrai Erőmű Rt. is a foreign-owned
power generator carrying out a big recon-
struction programme with the help of Hun-
garian partners. Power-generation equip-
ment was one of the large-scale COMECON
cooperation products of the Hungarian
electrical industry. After the transition, this
cooperation network was largely destroyed,
but there are recent tendencies to re-create
the industry with Ganz and Transelektro as
the integrators (SZANYI and TARI, 2000). The
consortium organized for Mátrai Erőmű re-
construction includes traditional Hungarian
suppliers and privatized ones – ABB,
Siemens and a few other TNCs. Mátrai
Erőmű prepared a detailed questionnaire for
potential SME suppliers and circulated the
conditions of delivery through the local
SME promotion network. Matchmaking was
further supported by a local Enterprise De-
velopment Fund conference on supply op-
portunities. These efforts yielded a list of
242 potential suppliers. Unfortunately, it is
not yet clear how many of them were actu-
ally contracted.
The Japanese first-tier automotive
supplier Denso also searched actively for
Hungarian suppliers. The company already
has a number of Hungarian and several EU
suppliers. Because Denso is rather cost-
sensitive, it continually seeks new, cheaper
suppliers. This could bring opportunities for
Hungarian SMEs. Denso has developed a
strict, multi-level evaluation programme. It
started recruitment by holding a meeting of
some 100 nearby firms. There it presented
its products and gave the technical pa-
rameters for the parts it wished to outsource
locally. Next, potential suppliers made of-
19
fers that were evaluated, after which Denso
staff visited promising companies. Where
positive feedback is received, the company
goes on to order a first batch of sample pro-
duction. With more sophisticated compo-
nents, this is followed by investigations at
headquarters in Japan. The tests cover du-
rability as well as quality, so that the testing
procedures are lengthy. After a positive sig-
nal is received from its laboratories, Denso
visits the supplier again and checks the
equipment, management and financial con-
ditions for ability to ensure regular, punc-
tual delivery and constant quality. Where
these conditions are met, the supplier may
be contracted, if the parties can agree on
sequencing, quantities, deadlines, and a
usually not very high price. In fact, the low
prices paid are offset by large batches,
which make production profitable. Only a
few firms have qualified, but Denso believes
that through substantial investment in
equipment, measuring devices and quality-
control systems, the technology level of its
suppliers can be upgraded to the required
level. Unfortunately, no mention has been
made if Denso actively supporting such ef-
forts by potential partners.
Rába Rt. was the third case study in
ÚT-EUROCON (2001). This majority Hun-
garian-owned integrator firm produces
various components for trucks, including
diesel engines and shafts, and works with
over 1000 suppliers. The share of imports
in its procurement is 25–30 per cent, and
there are also FIEs delivering to Rába from
Hungary. Some important sub-assemblies
are produced by its own affiliates – former
workshop divisions that became part of a
holding-type network around Rába estab-
lished during the privatization process.
Rába puts much effort into supporting
members of the group, but it is not strong
enough to extend this activity beyond the
group. Besides traditional Hungarian sup-
pliers (with their problems) Rába has also
sought new partners, especially in spatially
more distant locations of Eastern Hungary,
where it had no traditional supplier links.
Rába faced difficulties similar to the ones
encountered by the FIEs: only 5 per cent of
potential suppliers qualified technically and
a mere 3 per cent could offer competitive
prices and subsequently became suppliers to
Rába. This case study also revealed a weak-
ness in the Hungarian integrator firm. It
seems that the position of the first-tier firm
largely determines the chance of success for
second-tier companies (SMEs). Rába fre-
quently calls for flexible responses to mar-
ket changes or sudden deliveries, or cancels
orders. This makes production and capacity
utilization difficult and caused even greater
problems for second-tier suppliers highly
dependent on Rába deliveries.
Because of the uncertainties, Rába also
launched a supplier development pro-
gramme like Suzuki’s. An agreement and
memorandum was signed, with the aim of
supporting SMEs and other suppliers par-
ticipating in the Rába supplier network. The
support is to be provided by Rába and some
local enterprise-development agencies.
Funding comes partly from local and state
sources. The services provided under the
scheme include auditing of suppliers, finan-
cial support for continuous production and
product changes, technological develop-
ment, support for quality control, logistics
and management, marketing, and estab-
lishment of a temporary employment asso-
ciation.
* * * * *
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